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Summary
Because promotions are an important source of wage growth, we argue that the low incidence
of promotions among part-time workers will contribute to the emergence of the part-time wage
gap. We test this claim using Dutch employer–employee matched data. We find that the part-
time wage gap is absent among young school leavers, but that it is well established among more
mature workers. Moreover, we find that promotions account for a wage growth of about eight
log points. Finally, workers in part-time jobs experience a lower rate of promotion relative to
workers in full-time jobs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Women in the labor market reportedly fare badly because they must combine
labor market activities with family and fertility decisions; a trade-off which
their male counterparts seldom face (Goldin 1997, OECD 2001).1 In fact,
women’s participation in labor market activities is intimately connected to
women’s role within the household (Blau 1998, OECD 2002, Blau and Kahn
2003).
However, the introduction of flexible work arrangements, such as part-
time employment, has facilitated the reconciliation of women’s multiple roles
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1 The extent of the gender wage gap has diminished over time as women have accumulated
more human capital and women’s presence on the labor market has become more and more
customary (Blau and Kahn 1997). The gender wage gap tends to be reduced by the inclusion
of the number of working hours among the covariates, however (Boden and Galizzi 2003, Joy
2003). Controlling for personal and job characteristics, the Dutch gender wage gap is about
7% (Portegijs et al. 2002).
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in the household and in the labor market, leading to increased women
labor market participation. Consequently, part-time employment has quickly
achieved extreme popularity among Dutch women of all age groups (Euwals
and Hogerbrugge 2004). Women are usually happy with their part-time jobs
(Fagan and Burchell 2002) because they regard them as the result of personal
choices rather than as a failure to get a full-time job (men less so). In fact,
part-time workers may engage in the home production of expensive (or high
quality) services that would otherwise be purchased on the market (Freeman
and Schettkat 2005). Consequently, part-time workers may be ready to accept
a compensating differential in the form of a low wage.
Indeed, part-time workers tend to receive lower average wages (“wage” has
to be understood as the hourly wage throughout the paper) than their full-
time colleagues. Most of the gap disappears, however, once it is controlled
for job and workers’ characteristics. The little difference that remains unex-
plained is referred to as the part-time wage gap (the difference between the
wage earned by otherwise equal part-time and full-time workers).
Small part-time wage gaps appear to characterize most European coun-
tries represented in the European Community Household Panel and is related
to pattern of occupational segregation (Manning and Petrongolo 2005). In
the US, using CPS sample and controlling for unobserved individual char-
acteristics by means of lagged working hours, it is found that most of the
raw part-time wage gap is explained by observable worker and job charac-
teristics, that wage changes upon changes in working hours are small except
when the change in hours is accompanied by a change in industry or occu-
pation (Hirsch 2005). Moreover, in both the US and the UK (using the
National Longitudinal Study of Youth and the New Earning Survey Panel
Data, respectively) returns to work experience in part-time jobs are lower
than returns to experience in full-time jobs (Gregory and Connolly 2001,
Green and Ferber 2005a) and the part-time wage gap is almost naught
among young workers (the UK result is obtained using the British Household
Panel Survey). Furthermore, the part-time pay gap is found to widen with
age (Manning and Robinson 2004, Hirsch 2005), and the negative effect of
spells of part-time works last over time (Gregory and Connolly 2001, Green
and Ferber 2005b). The scarring effect of part-time work spells has also been
found – using the OSA supply panel – to affect Dutch women (Roman et al.
2004).
Although the longitudinal evidence suggests that it is unmeasured workers
skills that are the principal determinant of the part-time wage gap, the precise
mechanism through which the gap arises for workers who have stayed with
the same employer has not been identified, yet.
We examine similar evidence for the Netherlands, confirming the patterns
found for other countries. We extend the literature on the part-time wage gap
by documenting the paucity of promotion opportunities faced by part-time
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workers. The focus on the nexus between part-time work and promotions rep-
resents the original contribution of this paper to the literature on the part-
time wage gap. Since wage increases upon promotion are substantial, over the
whole career, part-time workers would experience a lower wage growth than
their full-time colleagues. Consequently, a part-time wage gap emerges over
time.
Hence, there may be a downside to part-time work because of its adverse
effects on workers’ careers that results from the interaction between part-time
work (working hours) and firms’ incentive mechanisms. In fact, firms may
use promotions to stimulate human capital accumulation and skill acquisition
(Gibbons and Waldman 1999). Since human capital accumulation is slow in
part-time jobs, the incidence of promotion will be low among part-time work-
ers. In addition, firms may use the number of hours worked as a screen-
ing device (Landers et al. 1996) or to measure effort (like in a tournament).
In both cases the incidence of promotions would be low among part-time
workers. Thus, firms’ promotion behavior introduces a nexus between actual
labor market experience and the part-time wage gap. More precisely, the
part-time wage gap would not arise as young workers opt to work on a part-
time schedule upon entering the labor market, but it would rather develop
over time as the effects of foregone promotions during spells of part-time
employment accumulate. Moreover, the gap would not disappear when work-
ers would revert to full-time jobs.
The nexus between part-time work and career is of importance because
to the extent that lower wages and diminished career opportunities are
long-term consequences of part-time employment spells, these features would
make part-time jobs less desirable. This, in turn, generates negative exter-
nalities affecting aggregate employment because in the Netherlands part-time
work has been found to have a multiplicative effect on aggregate employ-
ment at the macro level (Van Lomwel and van Ours 2005). In addition, since
the decision to work part-time work is intimately related to fertility, factors
diminishing the appeal of part-time work may generate negative externalities
on fertility rates, and eventually on human capital accumulation (Bovenberg
2005).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
underpinnings for the persistence of an equilibrium part-time wage gap. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the data set used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses
the results of the empirical analysis, and Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
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2 THE PART-TIME WAGE GAP
2.1 Compensating Differentials
Equilibrium in the labor market may be characterized by a part-time wage
gap only if: (i) firms cannot change their mix of part-time and full-time jobs
to comply with workers’ preferences; (ii) worker heterogeneity, i.e., part-time
and full-time workers may not be exchangeable because part-time workers
may have strong preferences about when to work that may not coincide with
employers’ preferences about work schedule, or because the two types of
workers differ in their human capital; (iii) fixed labor costs.2
There are also factors with the opposite effect, i.e., factors that, in equilib-
rium, would generate a part-time wage premium. For example, in the pres-
ence of a variable product demand characterized by predictable peaks, firms
may be willing to pay in order to have the flexibility to absorb them (Hirsch
2005).
The supply side literature has focused on the role of human capital accu-
mulation. If there are fixed costs to learning, part-time workers would invest
less in human capital (and skill acquisition) than otherwise equal full-time
workers because fixed costs could be amortized over fewer working hours.
However, the slow human capital accumulation may also be the consequence
of the choice to work part-time if employers consistently allot less challenging
tasks (with little learning opportunities) to part-time workers (Fuchs Epstein
et al. 1999).
The empirical evidence – that shows very low returns to tenure and labor
market experience accumulated during part-time employment spells – seems
to be supportive of the human capital approach to the part-time wage gap
(Swaffield 2000, Walby and Olsen 2000, Connolly and Gregory 2004, Man-
ning and Robinson 2004, 2005, Hirsch 2005). In fact, the US part-time
wage gap becomes not significant once human capital and occupational skill
requirements are accounted for (Hirsch 2005).
2.2 The Career Perspective
The part-time wage gap may also evolve during workers’ career progression,
in fact, wage changes around promotions are substantial (Baker et al. 1994,
Booth et al. 2003, Belzil and Bognanno 2005).3
2 In the presence of fixed labor costs (such as hiring and training costs) firms may be able
to equalize labor costs across part-time and full-time jobs. However, because part-time work-
ers are more expensive than full-time workers, the former must accept lower wages than their
full-time colleagues (Biddle and Zarkin 1989).
3 A career is a broad concept, broader than that of a promotion because it includes hori-
zontal as well as vertical movements (up the hierarchical ladder, promotions). To the extent
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This view of the part-time wage gap entails that it would not arise con-
textually with workers’ choice to work part-time, but that it would rather
develop in step with workers’ career (or lack thereof) and in relation to firms’
provision of incentives. For example, firms use promotions to stimulate job-
related investments (Gibbons and Waldman 1999). If human capital accu-
mulation is faster in full-time jobs (relative to part-time ones) the incidence
of promotion will be higher among full-time workers than among part-time
workers. Over time, as the effects of foregone promotions cumulate, the part-
time wage gap would ensue.
Alternatively, promotions may also be used to stimulate investments in
effort, commitment, and flexibility. If working hours are taken to be a mea-
sure of effort (or commitment) the use of relative performance evaluations to
assign promotions (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Lazear 1995) would also result in
an equilibrium part-time wage gap when the measurement of workers’ per-
formance was not adjusted for the hours worked or when working hours
were to affect performance in a non-linear fashion. In such circumstances
part-time workers would be systematically outperformed by full-time work-
ers when competing for promotion.
In addition, when firms use the number of hours worked as a screening
device, as in the rat race model (Landers et al. 1996), firms require long work-
ing hours to allocate promotions in order to discourage workers with low
commitment from applying. Part-time workers will be regarded as less com-
mitted and less flexible workers because of their rival interests (typically the
family). Consequently, part-time workers would experience a low incidence of
promotions.
There is indirect evidence, based on US and UK data, of a positive rela-
tionship between the number of hours worked (overtime) and the incidence of
promotions among full-time workers (Bishop 1990, McCue 1996, Booth et al.
2003). UK data shows that, when part-time jobs are included, male workers
turn out to have a higher probability of being promoted than their female
colleagues (Booth et al. 2003). In other words, women’s choices for part-time
jobs may indeed lower their promotion probability and have long-lasting con-
sequences.
Similarly, the number of hours worked has a positive effect on the (per-
ceived) probability of promotion for a sample of German and US workers
(Bell and Richard 2000). This seems to be the case in the Dutch labor mar-
ket too, past part-time employment spells have long-term negative effects on
Dutch workers’ wages, and these effects are larger for men than for women
Footnote 3 continued
that experiencing a transition, be it vertical or horizontal, is conductive to wage increases our
argument will carry through. Therefore, we will use the two terms, career and promotion,
interchangeably through the paper.
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(Roman et al. 2004). Notice that part-time employment is almost the rule
among Dutch women while it is much less frequent among Dutch men. In
other words, where long working hours for men is the norm (but less so for
women), the gap for working part-time can be very high, and the wage gap
would be larger for men (the group affected by the norm) than for women
(Bell and Freeman 2000).4
It follows that when workers enter part-time employment (and Dutch
women are likely to do so) they also incur a long-run career handicap
because this choice reduces the likelihood of promotion (Kunze 2000). The
ensuing wage gap with respect to other workers (typically male colleagues)
who did not opt for part-time employment will be permanent and it will not
be reversed by a subsequent decision to work full time again.5
3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
The data set consists of employer–employee matched data resulting from a
two-stage sampling process. In the first stage organizations (firms) are ran-
domly sampled, in the second stage employees are sampled from firms’ pay-
roll and their characteristics are recorded. The fraction of workers sampled
is inversely proportional to firm size (i.e., the entire workforce is observed
in small firms). Workers’ characteristics are compiled from administrative
records by personnel of the Dutch ministry of Social Affairs and Employ-
ment (Venema and Faas 1999). The data cover all economic sectors. There-
fore, firms operating in the public sectors are included in the present analysis
(1.42% of the firms surveyed, accounting for 7% of the workers).
We use (pool) the waves 1999 and 2001 of the working conditions survey
(AVO, the waves are named after the year when the data become available),
based on two independent samples of firms. In the first wave (covering the
years 1997–1998, the 1999 wave) 1,625 firms are surveyed, and in the second
wave (covering the years 1999–2000, the 2001 wave) 1,558 firms are surveyed.
Each wave is a panel in that information on employees is collected twice:
in October 1997 and October 1998 for the first wave (and October 1999 and
October 2000 for the second wave). The two waves together do not form a
four-year panel; consequently, employees can be observed only for a maxi-
4 The relationship between part-time employment and promotion probability has also con-
sequences for the evolution of the gender wage gap. If female employees have a higher prob-
ability of working part-time compared to their male colleagues, the long-run effects of past
part-time employment would be compound in the gender wage gap. Therefore, to accurately
estimate the gender wage gap from a cross-section of full-time workers, researchers ought to
be able to control for past part-time employment (Green and Ferber 2005a).
5 To be sure, when mobility between labor market states is high focusing exclusively on full-
time workers may be misleading because full-time workers might have held a part-time job
somewhere in the past.
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mum of 2 years. However, within each wave the panel structure applies only
to the employees who stayed with the same employer the year out (infor-
mation about these employees is collected twice); employees leaving the firm
and newly-hired employees are observed only once. Employees who leave the
employer during the year are observed only at the beginning of each wave
(October 1997 or October 1999); employees who are hired during the year
are observed only at the end of each wave (October 1998 or October 2000).
While the previous labor market position of newly-hired workers is recorded
their previous wage and job type is not. Similarly, the data record the initial
wage of the workers who left the firm but no information is available about
their job (and wage) of destination.
The data does not contain any information concerning employees’ house-
hold situation or other demographic characteristics apart from age and edu-
cational attainment that could be useful to model the participation decision.
Therefore, the data limitations are such that our results should be interpreted
as being conditional on the participation decision. However, the bias intro-
duced is not likely to be large. In fact, 90% of the workers in our sample
did not undergo a change in their working hours but experienced (sometimes
consistent) wage changes.
Another particularity of our data relates to the job description, instead of
the standard occupation classification, the data set covers the two dimensions
of the job description that are relevant for pay and promotion decisions: Job
level (nine levels), which includes the autonomy of the decision making and
the complexity of the task, and an occupational classification (seven types),
which is similar to the standard one digit occupational classification. Addi-
tional information regarding the occupational classification can be found in
the working paper version of this article (Russo and Hassink 2005).
Along with the workers, and job characteristics, the number of hours
worked during the week (it is a typical week, without holidays) and the aver-
age contractual length of the working week at the establishment are also
reported.
The data also record if an individual has experienced internal mobility (5%
of the workers experienced horizontal or vertical mobility) or has been pro-
moted over the year (4% of the workers). According to the definition applied,
workers experience internal mobility when their position within the firm has
changed because the level of their job has changed (increased), there has been
a major change in their duties, or their tasks are now carried out in another
department within the same firm.
The data set has two related features that warrant its use: first, the infor-
mation about the wage is extremely precise. Second, the information about
the wage is extremely well detailed. The wage consist of two parts, the base
wage, which is linked to job title and occupation (it is the wage definition
used in standard wage scales), and a variable (individual) wage component,
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which includes overtime payments, compensating differentials (for unpleasant
working conditions), performance-related pay, and any other form of indi-
vidual (incentive) pay. This distinction is an attractive feature of the data
and makes it possible to use the base wage as the dependent variable in our
analysis, hence the part-time wage gap must be understood as a lower base
wage earned by part-time workers compared to otherwise equal full-time col-
leagues. The opportunity to use the base wage is particularly useful for the
following three reasons: first, base wages and promotions are linked to the
same wage scales. Second, the focus on the base wage avoids the effects of
the interaction between incentive pay and promotions that may blur the
results. Should promotion and incentive pay be negatively (positively) cor-
related, the inclusion of the variable wage part would weaken (reinforce)
the part-time wage gap because workers in part-time jobs would experience
less promotions but also higher (lower) incentive pay than their full-time
colleagues. Eventually, the negative effect of fewer promotions on the wage
could be offset by a higher variable wage component.
Third, and most important, the base wage is the wage component that is
least prone to be correlated with working hours across firms. In fact, the base
wage is the wage component that is most responsive to union wage bargain-
ing. This leaves firms little leverage to use this specific wage component to
shape a wage – working hour locus to match workers’ wage-working hours
preference (Biddle and Zarkin 1989).
Because of the particular Dutch situation, where many part-time jobs
involve fewer than 20 hours of work per week, in the empirical analysis we
will distinguish between three employment states: small part-time (fewer than
20 hours per week), part-time (20 hours or more but fewer than 36 hours per
week), and full-time (36 hours or more per week). The adopted definition of
part-time job appears to be rather accurate, according to the Dutch Cen-
tral Bureau of Statistics (survey of employment and wage) 6.6% of all jobs
between 30 and 35 working hours per week are full-time jobs, while 2.7% of
all jobs involving more than 35 working hours per week are, in fact, part-
time jobs.
Since the distribution of working hours has a large peak at 32 hours (for
both men and women) we will implement a sensitivity analysis with an alter-
native definition of part-time that sets the cut off at 32 hours (20 hours or
more but fewer than 32 hours per week).
The data used in the analysis amount to 62,581 workers who did not
change employer (43,163 males and 19,418 females) and 1,697 young newly
hired workers (school leavers, 1,007 males and 690 females). Part-time work-
ers (either in regular or in small part-time jobs) amount to 24% (60%) of
all workers (women). The contrast between men and women is less evi-
dent among young entrants the labor market, the share of part-time workers
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amount to 38% among school leavers and it increases to 53% among women
who have just left school.
The number of hours worked has a large impact on workers’ hourly wage:
the small part-time (part-time) wage gap amounts to 39% (17%) for women
and to 33% (30%) for men.
The median age of the Dutch female workers who reduced their working
time is 32, while it rises to 37 among women who increased their working
time. The data do not contain the information necessary to link the decrease
in hours worked to fertility decisions. The median age however is consistent
with the pattern of fertility among Dutch women. The changes in the hours
of work are not likely to be the result of measurement error because working
hours are derived from administrative records.
However, if the decision to work part-time reduces the probability of pro-
motion and promotions are associated with wage growth, part-time employ-
ment would still be associated with low wage growth, which would warrant
the emergence of a part-time wage gap in due time. Indeed, the average wage
growth among promotees is ten percentage points higher than the average
wage growth among their colleagues who are not promoted.
The list and the definition of the variables used, along with descriptive
statistics (for the sample of workers who did not change employer), can be
found in Appendix 1.
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Part-time Wage Gap
We investigate the effect of part-time on the wage, for which we correct for
observed characteristics of firms and workers and unobserved heterogeneity
of firms. The wage equation is
wi, f,t =β ′1PTi, f,t +β ′2Xi, f,t +β ′3Z f,t +β ′4PT f,t +β ′5X f,t +β ′6dt
+α f + εi, f,t t = 1998,2000 (1)
where w is the (logarithm) of the hourly wage; subscripts i , f and t refer to
the worker, firm and year respectively; PT is a vector of part-time dummies;
X is a vector of observed worker and job characteristics; Z is a vector of firm
characteristics; and d is a time dummy variable (equal to one when t =2000).
βk, k = 1,2, . . . ,6, are vectors of parameters. The unobserved firm effect is
captured by the sum of observed characteristics that vary across workers
within firms (PT and X ) and a random error term, α f , which is assumed to
be independent from PT, X and Z (Mundlak 1978). It can be shown that,
in this framework, the parameter estimates of (1) are equal to those obtained
with firm dummies. The advantage of specification (1) is that it becomes pos-
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sible both to estimate the effects of the worker-invariant variables Z and
to test for random effects versus fixed effects. The random error term ε is
assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across firms,
but ε may be correlated within firms (i.e. we calculate the so-called clustered
standard errors of the parameter estimates).
Next, we consider the regressors in greater detail. The vector PT consists
of two dummy variables, one for a part-time job with fewer than 20 hours
per week and a dummy variable for part-time job between 20 and 36 hours
a week. X includes the following variables. A dummy for foreign-born, age
and age squared, tenure and tenure squared, a dummy variable that signals
when workers received payments for overtime work, 5 education level dum-
mies, 6 occupational dummies, 6 job level dummies, and a year dummy. The
matrix Z consists of 7 firm size dummies, 10 industry dummies, 3 union sta-
tus dummies, and the average (contractual) length of the working week at the
establishment.
We estimate Equation (1) for male and female employees separately. The
results are shown in Table 1. It illustrates the sensitivity of the part-time wage
gap to two different wage definitions. Columns 1 and 2 give the estimates for
the hourly base wage. Columns 3 and 4 are based on the full (hourly) wage
that contains all individual pay components, i.e., compensating differentials,
performance bonuses, profit sharing and the piece rate. In all estimated mod-
els the estimated coefficients on PT and X are jointly significant, so that we
can reject a random effects specification (in favor of the fixed effects specifica-
tion). The estimates for the base wage imply that men (women) in small part-
time jobs have a wage gap of about 9.7% (2.2%) in comparison with their
full-time colleagues. Men (women) in part-time employment have a wage gap
of 3.0% (1.3%) with respect to their full-time colleagues.6
The part-time gap does not seem to hinge on the wage component used.
The part-time wage gaps do not change systematically when the wage defini-
tion is broadened to include all individual pay components. The small part-
time wage gap of women is reduced and so is the part-time wage gap of
men that turns not significant. This latter phenomenon can be ascribed to the
behavior of the individual pay components among male workers working 32–
35 hours per week.
Table 2 shows the sensitivity of the part-time gap to different definitions
of part-time work (20–35 hours or 20–32 hours). It shows that when the def-
inition of part-time work is narrowed to include individuals working fewer
6 Similarly, a part-time pay penalty ranging from 2.7% to 3.6% has been found in the UK
using the Labor Force Survey and both reported and hours based definition (fewer or equal
to 30 weekly hours) of part-time status (Manning and Petrongolo 2008). However, the part-
time wage gap is larger in the US, using the CPS data, the small part-time (part-time) gap is
11% (7%) for women and 21% (19%) for men (Hirsch 2005).
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than 32 hours per week (but more than 20) the part-time wage gap among
men, expressed in terms of the base wage, widens and it increases further
when individual pay components are added. That is, workers in part-time
jobs according to the narrow definition, relative to their full-time colleagues,
experience a part-time gap in the base wage and also in the individual pay
components.
To bypass the effects of past working experience (and past part-time
employment), we focus on young workers (their average age is about 20 years
and so is their median age) entering the labor market just after having
left school. We re-estimated equation (1) for this sub-sample of workers.7
Table 3 presents the estimates. The school leavers were just hired by the firm
and therefore their tenure is equal to zero. Since fertility decisions are rel-
atively far away for this group of workers, firms should not treat men and
women differently. However, the number of hours worked are already differ-
ent between men and women. Women work on average 25 hours per week
while men work on average 33 hours per week. This suggests that working
time decisions are sometimes taken upon entering the labor market.8
Table 4 shows the estimates for school leavers based on the alternative
part-time definition. They suggest that there is no part-time wage gap among
young workers, irrespective of the wage and of the part-time definition
adopted.9 Therefore, the part-time wage gap must arise over time as work-
ers progress in their career.
4.2 Part-time Employment and Promotion Probability
We now turn to the effect of part-time status on the probability of promo-
tion. The random effects specification we estimate is the following:
Pi, f,t =γ ′1PTi, f,t−1 +γ ′2Xi, f,t−1 +γ ′3Z f,t−1 +γ ′4PT f,t−1 +γ ′5X f,t−1
+γ ′6dt +λ f +νi, f,t t = 1998,2000 (2)
7 The development of the part-time wage gap over time could not have been captured by an
interaction term between job tenure and hours of work because workers may have changed
between part-time and full-time status in the past.
8 The average mothers’ age at first birth is about 27 years. Although, we cannot rule out the
possibility that some of the young women in our sub-sample already had children. The very
low average age suggests that this is not likely. We cannot elaborate on the fertility issue,
however, because of the lack of information about the employees’ household composition.
9 This could be the result of school leavers being a special group of workers whereby mini-
mum wage regulations might be particularly stringent thus constraining firms’ actions. In par-
ticular, it may be the consequence of particularly low wages paid to full-time school leavers.
In this case the difference between the average wage of full-time school leavers and full-time
workers should be larger than the corresponding difference between part-time school leavers
and part-time workers. In fact, the opposite is true.
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Pi, f,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the employee (i in firm f ) experi-
ences a promotion between t −1 and t and zero elsewhere. γk , k =1,2, . . . ,6,
are vectors of parameters to be estimated. Like in equation (1), the unob-
served firm effect is the sum of observed characteristics that vary across
workers within firms (PT and X ) and a random error term, λ f , which is
assumed to be independent from PT, X and Z . The random error term ν is
i.i.d.
The estimation results are shown in Table 5 that illustrates the sensitivity
of the part-time wage gap to different promotion definitions: internal mobil-
ity (a broader concept of career including horizontal as well as vertical mobil-
ity) and promotions proper. Table 6 shows the sensitivity of the part-time gap
in career opportunities to different definitions of part-time work (20–35 hours
or 20–32 hours). The negative relationship between the part-time employment
dummies and the promotion probability stands out clearly. Men and women
in part-time employment experience reduced career opportunities, that is, a
smaller incidence of internal mobility and promotions, irrespective of the def-
inition of part-time work adopted. The effect is stronger for workers in small
part-time jobs (both male and female), and it is particularly strong for men.
However, we do not detect gender differences in the promotion probability.
The differential incidence of promotion between part-time and full-time
workers is enough to sustain an equilibrium part-time wage gap because pro-
motions are accompanied – on average – by wage growth acceleration of
about 10% for men and women alike.10
All in all, our results suggest that the number of hours worked does not
affect the wage growth directly, but it does so indirectly through the low inci-
dence of promotions and diminished career opportunities among part-time
workers.
The larger part-time wage gap experienced by male workers relative to
female workers still remains to be explained. We offer two possible reasons
for this phenomenon. The first one posits that female workers switch more
often between part-time and full-time jobs than male workers. Consequently,
most female workers would spend at least some of their time in the labor
market in part-time employment. In contrast, male workers tend to be stuck
in one form of employment with little opportunity of change, full-time work-
10 The wage growth associated with internal mobility drops to 8 percentage points when
individual and firm specific characteristics are controlled for. Internal mobility could be the
result of internal restructuring rather than of career progression. Assuming that restructur-
ing is accompanied by downsizing, we have estimated the impact of internal mobility on
wage growth on the sub-sample of firms that experience negative employment growth over
the period. Internal mobility is still associated with a wage acceleration of about 8% for men
and women (results available from the authors upon request). Moreover, once the effect of
promotions is accounted for, the transition between employment states does not seem to be
related to wage growth in any clear way (Russo and Hassink 2005).
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ers tend to work full-time for their entire working life and workers hold-
ing small part-time jobs tend to hold them throughout. In this scenario the
female part-time wage gap would be smaller than the male part-time wage
gap, even if male and female workers would have the same promotion prob-
ability. In fact, during the 1990s between 24% to 29% (6%) of women (men)
held a part-time position in the three years prior to the interview (Roman
et al. 2004), over the same period 22% of female workers with a full-time
job switched to a part-time job within the following 4 years (Muffels et al.
1998). The high rate of mobility of women between part-time and full-time
jobs could be a Dutch phenomenon, however.
The second explanation we offer relies on the differential salience of part-
time employment among male and female workers induced by the popular-
ity of part-time employment among female workers. If most women choose
to work part-time (and Dutch women are likely to do so), part-time employ-
ment status cannot be used as a screening device because it ceases to be infor-
mative about work attitudes. On the contrary, because part-time employ-
ment is still a rather uncommon phenomenon among men, part-time status
becomes salient. In this case, men in part-time jobs may be adversely affected
by firms’ screening behavior (but women are not) and the part-time wage gap
among men would be larger than the one found among women.
4.3 Synthesis and Discussion
All in all, our result seem to suggest that the part-time wage gap takes time
to develop: we find that transitions between part-time and full-time status
do not seem to affect wage growth in any clear way, that internal mobility
and promotions are an important source of wage growth (Russo and Hassink
2005) and that the part-time wage gap is not observed among school leavers
(irrespective of the wage and part-time definition). Furthermore, we find that
workers (men and women alike) forego promotion possibilities during part-
time employment spells and consequently miss important wage growth accel-
erations.11
On the one hand, the part-time pay gap is not likely to be due to firms
having an interest in the number of hours and trying to equalize labor
cost between full-time and part-time jobs because we have chosen the wage
components on which employers have least control. Therefore, employers’
ability to adjust wages to the number of hours is minimized (Biddle and Zar-
kin 1989). In fact, the wage component used in the analysis—the base wage-,
11 US workers (men and women) suffer a substantial wage gap for time out of the labor
market in the early stages of their careers (Light and Ureta 1995). The same result is found
among German pupils spending different amounts of time in the apprenticeship system (Kunze
2002).
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being the result of collective bargaining, tracks the job title and occupation
very closely and it is the wage component that is least amenable to manipu-
lation by (individual) employers.
On the other hand, the negative effect of part-time on wages and pro-
motions may be influenced by unobserved workers characteristics affecting
wages, promotions, and the probability to work part-time. To pursue this
issue further, we have modeled the probability to work part-time and the
probability to experience internal mobility simultaneously, by means of a
bivariate Probit model. The dependent variable in the part-time equation
takes on the value one if workers work part-time (either part-time or small
part-time) and zero otherwise. Both equations of the bivariate Probit model
have the same explanatory variables as equation (2). This set-up makes it
possible to estimate the direction and the strength of correlation between
unobserved components that affect the likelihood to work part-time and the
incidence of promotions. The bivariate Probit model is estimated for men
and women separately. We found negative (small but significant) correlations
among the error terms in both samples (−0.119 for men and −0.170 for
women). In other words, unobservable characteristics that tend to increase
the probability to work part-time tend also to decrease career opportuni-
ties.12
Unobserved ability/productivity is not a likely candidate, however, in fact,
in the psychological literature part-time workers are found to be similar to
their full-time colleagues in many productivity related attitudes (Thorsteinson
2003). Moreover, the choice to work part-time is also influenced by social
norms, which influence the choices of all workers irrespective of their abil-
ity/productivity (Burke and Reitzes 1991, Akerlof and Kranton 2000, Booth
and van Ours 2006). Rather, it is plausible to conjecture that part-time work-
ers are time-constrained workers, and that part-time schedule is an instru-
12 Similarly, to the extent that part-time status and the error term in the wage regression
are negatively correlated owing to lower levels of unobservable characteristics among part-
time workers, the estimated part-time pay gap would over-estimate the true part-time pay gap.
To purse the endogeneity issue in the wage regression we have instrumented current working
hours with past working hours. There is a great deal of stability in small part-time employ-
ment, but much less so in part-time employment: 89% (91%) of the men (women) holding
small part-time jobs in (t − 1) held the same position in t ; 33% (66%) of the men (women)
holding a part-time job in (t −1) held the same position one year later. The estimated part-
time wage gaps obtained when working hours are instrumented by past working hours are
very close to those in Tables 1 and 2. Past working hours are relevant instruments, the joint
significance test (F-test) in the first stage regressions is very high: it is as high as 3,018.49
(9,275.86) in the case of small part-time for men (women), 3,002.06 (8,874.29) in the case of
part-time for men (women). We do not emphasize these results, however, because past hours
are not exogenous instruments when unobserved factors affecting hours and wages persist over
time (Hirsch 2005). The full set of results from the bivariate Probit and the IV regressions are
not shown for want of space but they can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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ment to conciliate work and non-work activities. The time bind part-time
workers experience, in turn, could transform into an insurmountable obstacle
to career when the time input is an important element in the firms’ incentive
schemes governing promotions and career advancements.
Finally, we want to stress that irrespective of the unobserved factors caus-
ing the part-time wage gap, our analysis suggests that the ensuing wage
effects are plausibly played out through diminished career opportunities for
part-time workers.
5 CONCLUSION
In the Netherlands, like in many developed countries, the part-time wage gap
(controlling for work and job characteristics) is small and it is close to zero
for young workers but it grows with age. Moreover, we find that the part-
time pay gap is larger for men than for women.
The main contribution – the original element in our analysis – is to show
that in the Netherlands the observed pattern is driven by differences in pro-
motion rates between part-time and full-time workers.
We have found that the part-time wage gap does not arise at onset when
workers enter the labor market or when workers change the number of hours
worked but it rather develops over time as labor market experience accumu-
lates. In addition, part-time workers tend to have a lower promotion proba-
bility – characteristics that increase the probability of part-time employment
tend to reduce the incidence of promotions – and promotions are accompa-
nied by a wage growth acceleration of about eight percentage points.
The negative association between part-time employment and the incidence
of promotions (largely capturing differences in personal attitudes, albeit we
have little direct evidence on this) is a rather important relationship for coun-
tries like the Netherlands where part-time work is an important policy instru-
ment that has effectively contributed to the reduction of unemployment and
to the increase in female labor force participation. In fact, our analysis sug-
gests that the part-time jobs women so readily accept will offer them limited
career possibilities, to the extent that these make part-time work less appeal-
ing there could be adverse effects on aggregate employment (and unemploy-
ment) dynamics. The flip side of this coin is a call for public support for the
introduction of family friendly human resource practices, in particular those
aimed at reducing the career penalties associated with part-time work. In fact,
individual firms will not count among the benefit deriving from the introduc-
tion of family friendly human resource practices their positive external effect
on aggregate employment.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Definition Men Women
Mean Std. Mean Std.
err. err.
Hours Hours worked in
the week (log)
3.60 0.26 3.21 0.56
Small part-time Hours worked in
the week<20
Dummy variable 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.43
Part-time 20≤ hours worked
in the week<36
Dummy variable 0.02 0.14 0.25 0.43
Full-time Hours worked in
the week≥ 36
Dummy variable 0.95 0.21 0.51 0.50
Foreign Foreign worker
(non Dutch)
Dummy variable 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.21
Age Worker’s age 40.09 10.35 37.30 10.31
Tenure Years with current
employer
10.96 9.43 7.61 6.84
Primary Basis education
(LO)
Dummy variable 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25
Low general First level general
education
(MAVO)
Dummy variable 0.07 0.26 0.19 0.39
Low vocational First level
vocational
education (MBO)
Dummy variable 0.39 0.49 0.22 0.41
Secondary general Secondary school
diploma (HAVO,
VWO)





Dummy variable 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43
University University (WO) Dummy variable 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.31
Technical Technical
occupation
Dummy variable 0.44 0.50 0.11 0.31
Administrative Administrative
occupation
Dummy variable 0.10 0.30 0.31 0.46
Information technology IT occupation Dummy variable 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.10
Commercial Commercial
occupation
Dummy variable 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.32
Services Service occupation Dummy variable 0.21 0.41 0.41 0.49
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TABLE A1 – continued
Variable Definition Men Women
Mean Std. Mean Std.
err. err.
Management Management Dummy variable 0.12 0.33 0.04 0.19
Creative Creative
occupation
Dummy variable 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.13
Very simple tasks Level I Dummy variable 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.22
Simple and repetitive
tasks
Level II Dummy variable 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.33
Routines with simple
decision making




Level III high Dummy variable 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40
Difficult tasks, decision
making
Level IV Dummy variable 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44
Difficult tasks, initiative Level V Dummy variable 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.28
Management Level VI Dummy variable 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.14
Upper management Level VII Dummy variable 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02
1–4 Fewer than 5
employees at the
firm
Dummy variable 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15
5–9 5–9 Employees at
the firm
Dummy variable 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.22
10–19 10–19 Employees
at the firm
Dummy variable 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28
20–49 20–49 Employees
at the firm
Dummy variable 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.32
50–99 50–99 Employees
at the firm








Dummy variable 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39
=>500 500 or more
employees at the
firm
Dummy variable 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42
Agriculture ISIC (Rev. 3)
01–05
Dummy variable 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.09
Mining ISIC (Rev. 3)
10–14
Dummy variable 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.07
Manufacturing ISIC (Rev. 3)
15–37
Dummy variable 0.34 0.47 0.18 0.38
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TABLE A1 – continued
Variable Definition Men Women




ISIC (Rev. 3) 40–41 Dummy variable 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.10
Construction ISIC (Rev. 3) 45 Dummy variable 0.09 0.29 0.01 0.10
Wholesale &
retail trade
ISIC (Rev. 3) 50–52 Dummy variable 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36
Restaurants
& hotels




ISIC (Rev. 3) 60–64 Dummy variable 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.22
Financial
services
ISIC (Rev. 3) 65–67 Dummy variable 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.22
Business ser-
vices




ISIC (Rev. 3) 75 Dummy variable 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25
Education ISIC (Rev. 3) 80 Dummy variable 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10
Health
services




















Dummy variable 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.20
AVV AVV Dummy variable 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17
Non union Not covered by any
union agreement





hours per week at
the firm, in log






3.30 0.38 3.12 0.33
By the number of
hours worked (in
log)
3.37 0.39 3.16 0.34
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TABLE A1 – continued
Variable Definition Men Women














Dummy variable 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21
Promotion Worker has been
promoted
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